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Abstract 
The transition away from fossil fuel based infrastructure for heating and cooling has to happen on a 
scale and timetable with no historical precedent. As the systems are large and networked, path-
dependencies constrain the transition that is further complicated by the diversity of stakeholders. 
Here we analyse the case of transitioning the district heating system in the city of Helsinki, Finland, 
within the target of a carbon neutral metropolitan area. Despite relatively advanced climate policies, 
path-dependencies on the political, technological-material and economical levels interact in creating 
a ”wicked” problem with no obvious solution and potential for backsliding. It is in this context that 
a possibility of a green paradox arises: despite the explicit commitment of all stakeholders towards 
carbon dioxide emission reductions, the combination of the path-dependencies may result in a 
transition that increases emissions. Our results highlight policy implications of path-dependencies 
for researchers, government and business.
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28 worst effects of climate change and to achieve the goals of the Paris agreement 2015. The 
29 literature on transition emphasizes the need for a deep-seated and wide-ranging transition 
30 within three decades [1], [2], [3], while acknowledging that the combination of the needed 
31 scale and pace of change has no historical precedent [4], [5].
32
33 From the perspective of material and energetic conditions of societies, the crucial question is 
34 the legacy infrastructure that has been built, maintained and is still run mostly on fossil fuels 
35 [6], [7]. The infrastructure includes power plants, energy transmission and storage systems, 
36 buildings, transport systems, and city structures, which in Smil’s [7] estimate correspond to 
37 at least 25 trillion USD (1990 international dollars) in investments during the last century 
38 alone. 
39
40 Replacement, early retirement or retrofit of existing infrastructure is constrained by 
41 economic, political and technical factors with their own historical trajectories. The interlinked 
42 path-dependencies make the problem complicated. There is a diversity of stakeholders, and 
43 decisions made now will result in lock-in of development paths and resources for potentially 
44 several decades, while every year of inaction necessitates even faster cuts of emissions in 
45 the future. Responding to these problems implies using systemic knowledge about the 
46 interactions of stocks and resource use at different spatial and temporal scales [8]. 
47
48 Here we build on the existing literature of path-dependencies and connect it with the 
49 literature on transitions. We then use this general context to frame one recent case in 
50 Finland as illustrative of the real-world path-dependencies and their effect on climate action: 
51 the role of the district heating (DH) system in the city of Helsinki in the overall goal of carbon 
52 neutrality nationally and in the Helsinki metropolitan area. 
53





























































55 technological, economical, infrastructural, institutional and political. The so-called multi-level 
56 perspective [9], [10], analyses transitions arising from the interplay at three analytical levels: 
57 “niches (the locus of radical innovations), socio-technical regimes (the locus of established 
58 practices and associated rules that enable and constrain incumbent actors in relation to 
59 existing systems), and an exogenous socio-technical landscape” [9]. Here we concentrate 
60 on the level of socio-technical regimes as the level where the analyzed constraints and path-
61 dependencies appear, and the analysis will concern the technological, economical and 
62 political perspectives. The “wickedness” [11] of the problem of transition is illustrated by the 
63 possibility that despite the explicit commitment to the goal of carbon neutrality by all relevant 
64 stakeholders, the current trajectory for the system may lead to a “Green Paradox” [12]: due 
65 to efforts towards transition, the actual amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions may 
66 increase.
67
68 Overall, the purpose of this study is to show how path-dependencies interact in creating a 
69 complicated problem for energy transition with no obvious solution and even potential for 
70 backsliding. Furthermore, our analysis offers guidance on how policies may be changed so 
71 that the green paradox can be avoided.
72
73 In this case study our research questions are:
74
75 1. What are the key path dependencies, constraints and legacy technological solutions 
76 in DH in Helsinki, as framed by the need to move to carbon neutral energy provision?
77 2. How do these path-dependencies underlie the wickedness of the problem of 
78 transition towards carbon neutral energy, and even point toward a trajectory creating 
79 a green paradox? 































































83 2 Background: Energy transitions, lock-ins, path-dependency and the green paradox
84
85 It is abundantly clear that there is a need for massive shift in the way energy is generated 
86 and used. While there is a constant barrage of news about breakthroughs of renewable 
87 energy in the markets, and their cost is starting to be competitive [13], past experience of 
88 energy transitions is worth observing. Historically, transitions have been slow, and the 
89 evolution of technologies is influenced by problems of scale and previous infrastructure [6], 
90 [7]. 
91
92 Recently, Sovacool [4] suggested that the present transition might be proceeding quicker 
93 than historical examples. The conventional transition literature, e.g., [14], [7], posits that it 
94 takes between 50 and 160 years for a total energy transition to occur. Sovacool [4] suggests 
95 that future energy transitions can be accelerated to the point where they take only a few 
96 years or decades. On the other hand, Smil [7] and Fouquet [15] argue that scaling issues 
97 and legacies from previous technology point to a more conservative estimate. Smil [7] offers 
98 a critique of Sovacool’s [4] suggestion, citing evidence suggesting that at a national level 
99 transition can be fast, but on the global level it is much slower. The slow pace is mainly due 
100 to path-dependency and technological lock-ins. 
101
102 Fouquet [15] offers a review of energy path-dependency and lock-in situations. A lock-in 
103 situation is usually referred to when energy generation is preferential to using a system that 
104 is either less energy-efficient or is highly energy-intensive compared to best available current 
105 technologies. Lock-ins happen when there are high infrastructure costs or there exist 
106 legacies of previous infrastructure that would be expensive to change or retrofit. They can 
107 also happen through historical trajectories where early-on competition has pushed an energy 





























































109 becoming the dominant technology [16], [15]. There is a wide literature on this issue, usually 
110 under the title “history matters” [17], [18], [19]. 
111
112 Lock-ins and path-dependencies are not only a matter of infrastructure and technology, but 
113 may also arise due to policy decisions. For example, the “green paradox” is an example of 
114 adverse policy fueled path-dependency. The concept was coined to illustrate a situation 
115 where the announcement of a future climate policy, such as a carbon tax, raises short-term 
116 emissions as fossil fuel producers increase their extraction today as a response to an 
117 anticipated reduction in future resource rents [20], [21], [12]. Other examples of green 
118 paradox include the observations that subsidies for renewable energy can increase 
119 emissions through increasing fossil fuel extraction [22] and that giving positive feedback to 
120 citizens on their green choices can lead to less green behavior by the same citizens [23]. 
121 Following [12], we will use the term in a wide sense to describe unintended negative (for 
122 instance, emission increasing) consequences of climate policies.
123
124 Harjanne & Korhonen [24] have pointed out how the use of the term “renewable energy” to 
125 cover a wide variety of very different forms of energy generation is problematic in 
126 discussions of transition. They note that the term contains problems with regard to 
127 sustainability, incoherence, policy impacts, and bait-and-switch tactics [24]. As an example 
128 of the bait-and-switch tactic, Harjanne & Korhonen [24] discuss the national coal ban in 
129 Finland, which is communicated as an accelerated action for climate change mitigation [25]. 
130 However, the expected outcome is a move towards wood biomass use [26], a renewable 
131 source, which, however, produces more end-of-pipe emissions compared to coal. 
132
133 In the current international GHG accounting framework, based on the Kyoto protocol and 
134 implemented in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS), bioenergy is treated as carbon 





























































136 sector (LULUCF) accounting. Furthermore, the EU has labeled wood biomass as a 
137 renewable energy source [27]. Consequently, fossil fuels are being replaced by wood 
138 biomass around Europe, including in Finland [28]. An additional incentive for the energy use 
139 of wood in Finland is provided by the government bioeconomy framework [29], [30], that, for 
140 instance, subsidizes wood chip production [31]. The problem is that carbon dioxide 
141 emissions per produced energy unit are higher from wood biomass than from coal, and the 
142 uptake of the “carbon debt” resulting from wood burning is conditional on the dynamics of 
143 biomass (re)growth [32]. Consequently, the climate benefits of transitioning from fossil fuels 
144 to wood have been contested on the global and European levels [32], [33], [34], [35], as well 
145 as in the context of the Finnish bioeconomy framework [36].
146
147 The life-cycle comparison between coal burning and wood biomass burning contains many 
148 variables, including combustion and processing efficiency, carbon intensity of combustion 
149 and carbon intensity of supply chain for both fuels, as well as the particulars of the forest 
150 type and harvesting methodology [32]. Recent research ([32], for studies using 
151 Finnish/Scandinavian forest data see [37], [38], [39]) suggests that repaying the resulting 
152 carbon debt from the transition from coal to wood takes several decades, even up to a 
153 century, which from the perspective of the needed pace of transition may be too slow. These 
154 results suggest that transitioning from coal to wood in energy generation may even increase 
155 carbon dioxide emissions within the crucial time frame for transition, rather than diminish 
156 them.
157
158 The coal ban and the implied move to wood biomass form the immediate background of our 
159 case study. Our intention is to analyze the path-dependencies and constraints that lie behind 
160 the “bait-and-switch” mentioned by Harjanne & Korhonen [24]. More generally, we use 
161 Helsinki district heating system as a case study on how a well-meaning and advanced 





























































163 dependencies on various levels, including the material, economical and policy levels. In our 
164 analysis, it is the interaction of the path-dependencies on these levels that creates 
165 complications for the transition and the potential for a green paradox. Furthermore, we will 
166 use the analysis of the path-dependencies in order to evaluate the policy implications of the 
167 case. 
168
169 The potential for the green paradox is set by the path-dependent structure of the existing DH 
170 system. It is technically built and optimized for a certain temperature and pressure, and 
171 needs a wide enough customer base to make economic sense. Under these circumstances, 
172 if the decision of replacing existing co-generation plants happens in a moment where 
173 emissions from coal are penalized or coal use is outright banned, and emissions from 
174 biomass are not, the result may be investment in a fleet of biomass burning plants that lock 
175 in years if not decades of increased emissions, even though the explicit goal at the moment 
176 of decision is to decrease emissions. 
177
178 Next, in section 3, the methods and data are described. In section 4, the object of our case 
179 study, the city of Helsinki district heating system is introduced from the perspective of its 
180 historical trajectory, and its main stakeholders. In section 5, the existing situation is briefly 
181 described from technical, economical and political perspectives before, in section 6, 
182 analyzing the material and policy-related path-dependencies, and showing how they interact 
183 in creating a complicated situation with a clear potential for a green paradox. The results are 
184 presented in section 7, before a discussion in section 8 and conclusion in section 9.
185
186 3 Methods and data
187
188 Our approach is exploratory and aims at description and understanding of a case within a 





























































190 preconceptions or hypotheses to test, like in the approaches labeled under grounded theory 
191 [41]. The research questions 1-2 are prompted by the problems in transition to low-carbon 
192 infrastructure, as articulated by multiple stakeholders. The questions are motivated by the 
193 need to find out which factors are stalling transition in the particular case, and the context for 
194 the questions is formed by the existing literature on transition and path-dependencies. They 
195 also lead directly to research question 3, as a better understanding of the path-
196 dependencies may inform the practices of the different stakeholders. 
197
198 The research setting is thus case-led rather than theory-led, and consequently the data 
199 gathering relies on methods (document analysis, participant observation) suited for 
200 exploratory contexts with low theoretical ambitions [42]. By definition, results from this kind of 
201 inductive and exploratory research setting cannot, as such, distinguish between existing 
202 theoretical views and the verification of the results is hard if not impossible. However, the 
203 results may be hypothesis confirming or hypothesis generating, like results from grounded 
204 theory approaches, which as [43] notes, have been fruitfully used for various topics in energy 
205 research.
206
207 For original data gathering, we used document analysis and participant observation. 
208 Document analysis refers to the process of collecting data via analyzing written documents 
209 [44]. The original data on the research questions 1-2 was gathered primarily through 
210 analysis of publicly available documents published by the stakeholders. A comprehensive list 
211 of the documents used is presented in the supplementary material. It contains the websites 
212 of the included stakeholders (national and local administration, the utility company, political 
213 parties, NGOs and research organizations), as well as documents from newspapers, web 
214 publications and social media. The documents were read, and notes taken on the views 
215 presented on the future of DH, the coal ban, use of wood biomass and other relevant issues. 





























































217 statistical methods were not needed. Documents were read and notes taken by multiple 
218 authors, and the main author independently verified from original sources the views 
219 presented here. The main document sources that are available online are referenced within 
220 this article.
221
222 Participant observation is often used in long-term studies intended for intensive involvement 
223 with a group of people, but it can also be used for data-gathering without the goal of deep 
224 anthropological or cultural study [45], [46]. Participant observation is recommended for 
225 research settings where researchers need to enrich their understanding of what questions to 
226 ask and for gaining an understanding of the meaning and relevance of the data [46]. In this 
227 case, participant observation was chosen as a method to facilitate direct contact with 
228 stakeholders in order to validate the data gathered from document review and to widen the 
229 range of what to look for in the data. 
230
231 The authors conducted the observation either as complete participants or as participants-as-
232 observers [45] in 14 different events and discussions on the theme of transition in DH in the 
233 Helsinki metropolitan area within the timeframe between September 2018 - January 2019. 
234 As the time period was limited and researchers from various universities and research 
235 groups were and have been involved in the discussions on transition for a long time in visible 
236 roles, the potential ethical dilemmas of participant involvement [47] could be kept to a 
237 minimum. The events ranged from private discussions and invite-only round-table 
238 discussions with less than 10 participants to large public events (see table 1). 
239 Representatives from all the analyzed stakeholder groups were present at the same time in 
240 at least three of these events, while participants in some of the events consisted only of one 































































Event Topic Date Participant stakeholders
Public 
seminar
Alternatives to coal in DH 26.9. 
2018




Technical and economic issues, 
esp. load and production curves
10.10. 
2018
ex-CEO of Helen Ltd
Private 
discussion







Technical and economic issues 2.11. 
2018
ex-CEO of Helen Ltd
Private 
discussion
Technical and economic issues 14.11. 
2018
ex-CEO of Helen Ltd
Roundtable 
discussion




City councillor (Greens), city 




Technical and economic issues 27.11. 
2018
ex-CEO of Helen Ltd
Private 
discussion
City ownership policy 4.12. 
2018








Representatives from city council 
groups, Helen Ltd., NGOs
Private 
discussion








Coal ban and DH 12.12. 
2018
City council group, Greens 
Roundtable 
discussion
Coal ban and DH 20.12. 
2018
Representatives of Greenpeace 









































































Discussion on the ”Clean district 
heating – how can it work?” report
7.1. 
2019
Representatives of Helen Ltd., 
NGOs
244
245 Table 1. Events of participant observation. Location for all events in Helsinki, Finland.
246    
247 The authors participated in the events (all more than once, and none in all of them) and took 
248 notes on their observations. The notes were collected and reviewed by multiple authors. As 
249 the goal was to find data on views that stakeholders explicitly hold and are willing to express, 
250 note-taking was limited to factual statements presented by the participants. For clarity and 
251 brevity, the findings from observations are reported in the article text without referring to 
252 particular events or notes. When the article relies on notes from spoken communications 
253 within the events, the correctness of the presentation has been confirmed with the relevant 
254 stakeholder(s) through subsequent direct communications (e-mail and phone) conducted 
255 during February-March 2019. 
256
257

































































263 generation [48]. These efforts, among other factors, brought into focus the need to improve 
264 primary energy efficiency and minimize fuel imports, leading to the adoption of DH [49]. The 
265 energy efficiency of energy generation from burning can be substantially increased in 
266 combined heat and power (CHP) units, and the DH network, in addition, contributes to 
267 improved total energy system efficiency [50]. Consequently, the efficiency of cogeneration is 
268 a key rationale and design constraint for the evolution of the DH system in Helsinki, setting a 
269 path-dependency right from the start. Helsinki had some city-block sized and smaller 
270 cogeneration units based on burning wood and coal already before the war [51]. However, in 
271 the decades after the war, the larger cogeneration plants were designed exclusively for coal 
272 burning, which constrains the temperature and pressure of the heat transmission liquid [49], 
273 which, in turn, determines, in part, network characteristics and parameters for customer 
274 equipment.
275
276 Altogether five big cogeneration plants have been built in Helsinki since the 1950’s (see 
277 Table 2 and Figure 1). The post-war demand for electricity was first met in 1953 by building 
278 the Salmisaari A power plant which uses a coal-powered turbine for electricity generation, 
279 and from 1957 on, the excess heat from the unit is captured and used for district heating. In 
280 1960, 1974 and 1984 new coal cogeneration plants are built (Hanasaari A and B, Salmisaari 
281 B). The first CHP plant using natural gas (Vuosaari A) is taken online in 1991 and a second 
282 in 1998 (Vuosaari B) [52].
283
284 Currently, Hanasaari A has been decommissioned, and Salmisaari A is a reserve unit, with 
285 Salmisaari B (electricity capacity 160 MW, heat capacity 300 MW), Hanasaari B (electricity 
286 capacity 220 MW, heat capacity 420 MW) and Vuosaari (electricity capacity 650 MW, heat 
287 capacity 600 MW) functioning as base load units [53]. In addition, the DH network has seven 
288 smaller heating plants around the city area with a total heat power of 2200 MW and a heat-





























































290 generation is done by burning coal (with heat generation capacity from coal at 890 MW), the 
291 rest being a combination of natural gas (ca. 30 %), heat pumps (using excess heat from 
292 waste water as a source, ca. 10%), wood biomass and heavy oil [55].
293   
294
Power plant Main 
fuel




Salmisaari A Coal 1950 ? Reserve 170 MW
Hanasaari A Coal 1960 2007 - -
Hanasaari B Coal 1974 Planned 2024 Base load 420 MW
Salmisaari B Coal 1981 ? Base load 300 MW
Vuosaari A Natural 
gas
1991 ? Base load 165 MW
Vuosaari B Natural 
gas
1998 ? Base load 430 MW
295
































































300 Figure 1. Timeline of Helen Ltd. power plants and main historical events 1950-2030.
301
302 In 2017, the district heating network comprised ca. 1300 kilometers and provided heat for ca. 
303 90% of the built cubic volume in Helsinki. The company sold 6 606 GWh of DH to 15 289 
304 connections, and the connection power (maximum load) was 3 400 MW [55].
305
306 The basis for the current utility company is formed in 1977, when the municipal electricity 
307 company and the municipal gas company are combined into the municipal energy company 
308 [52]. In 2015 the municipal company is transformed into a private enterprise (Helen Ltd.), 
309 with the City of Helsinki as the sole owner [52] (see Figure 1). Currently, the main business 
310 sectors of the company are district heating, district cooling and electricity [52]. In the 
311 following, we will concentrate on DH, only touching on electricity and district cooling when 
312 they relevantly affect the DH transition. In 2017, the company generated a profit of 81 million 
































































317 The stakeholders in the question of DH as a part of energy transition can be identified in 
318 different ways. Ultimately, as the issue of GHG emissions affects all life on the planet, the 
319 stakeholders involve all humans. More directly, the stakeholders include at least the utility 
320 company, its owners and customers, the citizens of the city and the whole metropolitan area, 
321 the national government and citizens of Finland, various NGOs and political organizations, 
322 researchers, fuel and technology suppliers, and the wider energy sector and its institutions. 
323 We will here concentrate on three stakeholders or stakeholder groups: the utility company, 
324 the city and NGOs/political organizations, and touch on the national level as a regulatory 
325 actor. We believe that the viewpoints presented by these three groups are sufficient to 
326 illustrate how the path-dependencies end up hampering intended climate action.
327
328 The main actor is the utility company that owns and runs the DH system. Its views are 
329 publicly available on its own website, where it presents both official information and more 
330 free-form audience-engaging content such as blog posts. The views of the utility company 
331 are also a point of public interest, so that its representatives are often interviewed both for 
332 journalistic and research purposes (e.g., [36]). 
333
334 The city of Helsinki has a dual stakeholdership: on the one hand it is the owner of the utility 
335 company, on the other hand it is a regulator determining policy. Ultimately, the city of 
336 Helsinki consists of its citizens that are represented by an elected city council overseeing the 
337 executive and regulatory affairs of the city. All major policy changes both with regard to the 
338 utility company and climate and energy policy have to pass through the council. The views of 
339 the council itself are a matter of public record [56], and its members representing various 






























































342 There is a number of NGOs and NGO-led campaigns advocating ambitious climate action, in 
343 general, and active in the discussions around DH, in particular. Three of these, Greenpeace 
344 Finland, The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (Suomen Luonnonsuojeluliitto) 
345 and FINGO (a NGO platform for global development), have dedicated staff on climate and/or 
346 forest issues, have published position papers on climate and forest issues [57], [58], [59] and 








355 Economically, the role of the company is to generate revenue for the owner, within the 
356 corporate governance guidelines set by the city [60]. Although the DH network is in its area 
357 of coverage something of a natural monopoly, at the edges of the network the company 
358 faces competition from other smaller providers that offer decentralized heating, e.g., via heat 
359 pumps with geothermal wells and ambient air as heat sources. In the densely built city 
360 center the monopoly is relatively secure, as alternative modes of heating are either 
361 technically not viable (for instance, it is very hard if not impossible to find space for 
362 geothermal wells) or much more costly (direct electric heating) [61]. However, investments 
363 into energy efficiency, such as insulation and heat pumps, may affect the economic bottom-
364 line also in the city center.
365
366 As observed in [50], the total competitiveness of DH is a combination of two cost 
367 components: first, the cost difference between centralized and decentralized heat supply 





























































369 sells diminishes, the proportional weight of the distribution cost in the calculation increases. 
370 Thus losing sales and customers via increased energy efficiency or transition to other 
371 methods of heating affects the bottom line of a DH provider substantially, as decreases in 
372 distribution cost are difficult to obtain. However, densification of urban areas may help keep 
373 distribution costs down, and modeling in [50] has indicated that in dense areas reduced heat 
374 demand is not a barrier to DH. In addition, it has been observed that taxation of competing 
375 forms of heating can increase the competitiveness of DH even in areas of low heat density 
376 [62].
377
378 In 2018, due to regulatory and political pressure, Helen Ltd. opened its DH network for other 
379 providers of heat, for which it pays a seasonally variable rate [63]. For the reason noted 
380 above, the open DH network is also a potential problem for the company. Industrial scale 
381 CHP units are economically most effective when they are used for base load capacities with 
382 uninterrupted uptimes. Consequently, functioning as a network operator promises less 
383 economic return than selling heat produced by the company itself. Furthermore, the pricing 
384 models are not developed enough for separating the network operator from the heat 
385 producers [64]. The company sees that if the share of the heat produced and sold by the 
386 company itself via its network plummets, maintaining the DH network and CHP units may 
387 lose commercial viability [65].
388
389 This network characteristic forms an important economic condition. For instance, network 
390 load and temperature adjustments and proactive reacting to weather patterns is best done 
391 on the system level (even though the development of smart metering and demand flexibility 
392 in so-called 4th generation DH systems may in time change the situation, [61], [64]). 
393 Likewise, economically the network needs a large enough customer base. From this 
394 perspective, there is a critical threshold for both control over the network and the amount of 





























































396 advantage in terms of energy efficiency compared to non-networked heat provision.
397
398 The basic economic setting is complicated by the fact that the owner, the city of Helsinki, 
399 also consists mainly of the customers of the company, the citizens of Helsinki. Helsinki 
400 residents are by definition owners of the utility company, and almost always in practice its 
401 customers. The majority of the profit generated by the utility company is included in the 
402 budget of the city. The budget, in turn, is governed by the city council for the benefit of the 
403 residents. The profit also comes out of the pocket of the residents in so far as they generate 
404 the revenue for the company by buying electricity and heat (part of the electricity is sold 
405 outside of Helsinki). Consequently, the customer price for DH is also partly determined by 
406 social factors. If the customers feel that the price is not right, they can vote for 
407 representatives that as the owners of the enterprise do have a say on company policies. 
408 Here the intertwinement of the economical and the political becomes evident: on one hand 
409 the company is statutorily governed to operate as a market actor, on the other hand the 
410 owner does set constraints informed by factors other than market prices.
411
412 5.2 Material and technological
413
414 The company makes agreements with customers, promising to deliver a certain amount of 
415 heat. When added together, the sum of these agreements gives the contractual peak load 
416 that the company is obliged to be able to provide (in 2018, the maximum contractual load 
417 was 3400 MW), even during the coldest periods of the year. Due to seasonal variation, there 
418 is considerable difference between the actual peak thermal load and the base load (around 
419 1500 MW) [66]. 
420
421 From the perspective of the plants generating heat, it makes sense to optimize the plant size 





























































423 load, usually necessitated by extended periods of below zero temperatures, creates another 
424 important technical constraint. Even though the peak load is required only for a small 
425 percentage of the year, it is also the time when customers are most reliant on the service. 
426 This necessitates having generating capacity up to double of base loads at the ready for 
427 peak periods. 
428
429 As noted above, the technical and energetic efficiency of the CHP units is best when they 
430 have long and uninterrupted uptimes. From this perspective, it makes sense to design the 
431 units to correspond to continuous base load use. The existing units have been optimized for 
432 cogeneration, and reach high levels of efficiency, up to 90% [66]. In the past few years, they 
433 have been readjusted to use a small percentage of wood pellets (up to 10 %) mixed with 
434 coal [53].
435
436 From the perspective of the network, one crucial factor is the physical location of heat 
437 producing units, constrained by the physical location of the most intensive and consistent 
438 user loads, supply and return temperatures, as well as city zoning and other regulation on 
439 power plant placement. Due to the historical factors discussed in section 3, the network is a 
440 so-called high-temperature network, with heat-exchanging temperatures in the hot loop 
441 between 65 – 120 °C, and during cold periods 80 – 120°C. The heat exchangers that 





447 The city of Helsinki and the other cities in the Helsinki metropolitan area have committed 
448 themselves to carbon neutrality [67]. The city of Helsinki has its own Carbon Neutral Helsinki 





























































450 and compensating all the rest by 2035 [68]. With regard to this goal, DH is a main concern, 
451 as it produces over 40 percent of the yearly emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent GHG 
452 gasses [69].
453
454 The biggest political groups in the city council for the current term in office (2017-2021) are 
455 the Greens and the right-wing National Coalition Party. For the Greens, climate action has 
456 been a major goal, and for them the CHP units with their open air coal storage areas and 
457 power plant chimneys very visible in the cityscape have been a sore point [70], [71]. The 
458 views of the Greens have been supported by NGOs such as Greenpeace, which during 
459 2018 collected a list of over 8000 signatures supporting rapid transition to a coal free 
460 Helsinki [72] and published a Gallup poll according to which two thirds of Finns support an 
461 end to coal in energy generation by 2025 [73]. Consequently, the 2018 decision [74] by the 
462 City Council to explore ways of providing heating without coal and to obligate Helen Ltd. to 
463 find ways of providing fossil free DH were presented as important achievement by the 
464 Greens [75], [70]. Most of the other groups in the council supported the motion.
465
466 As part of its EU climate agreements, Finland has committed to increasing the share of 
467 renewable energy sources to 50 percent by the year 2030 [76]. In 2015, the government of 
468 PM Juha Sipilä, representing the Centre Party, launched a bioeconomy program, where 
469 renewable products based on wood and other biomass, including energy from wood, figure 
470 centrally [29]. The bioeconomy program supports even non-renewable peat as a domestic 
471 energy source, both for DH and decentralized heating solutions. Toward this goal, the 
472 program includes the use of taxation so that peat is more competitive than coal, but more 
473 expensive than wood [77]. Major interest groups, such as The Central Union of Agricultural 
474 Producers and Forest Owners, which is closely aligned with the Centre Party, are strong 






























































477 The political constraints on DH have been recently brought to limelight with a national ban on 
478 coal burning by 2029 [25]. The year is earlier than the economical end-of-cycle for the 
479 existing CHP plants (estimated to be in the mid-2030’s). The Centre Party has presented the 
480 coal ban as the major climate action accomplishment by the government of PM Sipilä, with 
481 his Centre Party colleague Kimmo Tiilikainen as the Minister for Environment [78]. The other 
482 parties in government, the National Coalition and Blue Reform, supported the ban, as do 
483 majorities in the opposition parties. 
484
485 Concern over and opposition to the ban did not follow party lines. The opponents and 
486 skeptics that represent almost all of the major parties, have raised three kinds of concerns 
487 [79]. First, there are concerns over the effects on DH prices and the competitiveness of the 
488 companies. Second, opponents of the ban pointed out that, for instance, the Helsinki power 
489 plants can convert over ninety percent of the fuel energy into electricity and heat, while coal 
490 burning plants in Europe often operate on energy efficiency that is much lower, down to 
491 40%. This means that when the more effective coal burning plants are scrapped and their 
492 emission allowances released, carbon dioxide emissions in the EU may rise. Of course, this 
493 green paradox can be avoided if the state or another actor buys the released allowances, as 
494 suggested, for instance, by Helen Ltd. and The Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra [80], [81]. The 
495 third concern, one to which we will return below, is that given the current availability and 
496 pricing of heat sources, the most likely replacement for coal is biomass, with problems of its 
497 own. 
498
499 The analyzed environmental NGOs (Greenpeace, The Finnish Association for Nature 
500 Conservation and FINGO) recognize the possibility of a “green paradox” due to the coal ban 
501 and move to wood biomass. However, in their view the coal ban is necessary for a variety of 





























































503 something”.1 The NGOs have been frustrated by what they perceive as foot-dragging by the 
504 utility company. In their view, the company has been aware of the need to transition away 
505 from fossil fuels for three decades but has done little and found excuses for continuing coal 
506 burning. Second, the coal ban is needed as a signal of ambitious work against climate 
507 change. The argument goes that a developed country like Finland can help international 
508 efforts by setting an example. Third, the NGOs emphasize the role of research and 
509 development. Even if at the moment there is no realistic scenario for providing for the peak 
510 load with non-burning heat sources, new technologies can advance rapidly. Thus the 
511 representatives of the NGOs see that the utility company should launch ambitious R&D 
512 efforts, preferably in an open manner that could involve a wider community. Furthermore, the 
513 NGOs see that the coal ban is just one step on a long road. The issue of emissions (and 
514 other potential ecological damage, such as biodiversity loss) from burning wood biomass 
515 can and should, in their view, be tackled separately. 
516
517 From the perspective of the city, the possible increase in emissions is a more troubling 
518 issue, even though it, like the utility company, may under the current regulatory regime 
519 report diminishing emissions when transitioning from coal to wood. The city mayor, Jan 
520 Vapaavuori representing the National Coalition Party, has repeatedly maintained that 
521 economically the utilization of biomass benefits mainly other areas in Finland, and is not the 
522 best solution for the city, either economically or ecologically [82]. The city would prefer that 
523 Helen Ltd. runs the DH network on non-burning base load technologies. However, the city 
524 also requires that the company has to be competitive. In the current technological 
525 landscape, the company can not fulfill both demands from its owner at once.
526
1 The views summarised in this paragraph are gathered through participant observation, and 






























































528 6 Path dependency and its role in complicating transition
529
530 Given the political goal of carbon neutrality and the ban on coal use, the most urgent 
531 challenge for the DH system, and its operator, Helen Ltd., is replacing the existing coal-
532 powered CHP plants, Salmisaari B and Hanasaari B, with total heat capacity of 870 MW. 
533 Even though natural gas produces much less carbon dioxide than coal, also the natural gas 
534 powered plants Vuosaari A and B will need either replacement or carbon capture technology 
535 to become carbon neutral. In addition, natural gas is more expensive than coal and Finnish 
536 energy companies see low security of supply (with Russia as the only provider) as a barrier 
537 for increasing the role of natural gas [83]. The timeline of the coal ban, 2029, means that if 
538 scrapped, the plants will not reach the end of their planned lifecycle. As the company loses 
539 not only the heat generation from these plants but also the electricity generation, it loses 
540 some of its revenue and, consequently, means of investment. 
541
542 Currently, according to the utility company itself and confirmed by studies by research 
543 organizations, no economically competitive non-burning technology exists that could provide 
544 the needed amount of heat load for the peak periods [84], [61]. This is also the view held by 
545 city officials [85]. The only possible alternative would be the utilization of direct electricity-to-
546 heat boilers [61] but this alternative presupposes a massive increase in electricity availability 
547 and grid upgrades – matters that are not in the hands of the utility company. If the transition 
548 would happen in terms of boilers used within individual houses or blocks, a big part of the 
549 rationale for DH network would disappear. On the other hand, done in a centralized manner, 
550 the move to electricity-to-heat might use the DH network as a regulator of intermittent 
551 electricity generation. However, due to the technological constraints mentioned above, these 
552 options are not on the table. As the CEO of Helen Ltd., Pekka Manninen, has pointed out, 





























































554 the decision is made: in the future new non-burning alternatives, such as small modular 
555 nuclear reactors, may become available, but with currently available technology, the 
556 transition will result in wood biomass burning [86].
557
558 The utility company emphasizes that it has to operate within the current regulatory and 
559 contractual framework. Given the need to provide for the peak load and to operate with an 
560 acceptable profit margin, providing heat through burning is the best option for the company. 
561 As head of corporate responsibility for Helen Ltd., Maiju Westergren, puts it: “The fastest 
562 route away from coal and fossil fuels is via biofuels and via accepting the fact that we 
563 continue to burn something” [87]. With the end of coal use on the horizon, market conditions 
564 suggest biomass as fuel, as also pointed out by independent research [84]. In sum, the 
565 choice that fits the existing legacy parameters is to burn biomass instead of fossil fuel in the 
566 base load units that need to be constructed to replace the existing CHP units. 
567
568 As noted above, there is a list of concerns about the trajectory of replacing coal burning with 
569 biomass burning. These concerns are voiced, for instance, in the statements on the coal 
570 plan that stakeholders have left in the official governmental service collecting statements on 
571 new legislation [79]. The concerns with regard to a move to biomass expressed, for instance, 
572 by Helen Ltd. and other energy companies, include questions of availability, price, GHG 
573 emissions, small particle emissions, logistics and effects on biodiversity and other ecological 
574 effects. 
575
576 The official evaluation on the coal ban legislation concludes, based on a review of the views 
577 of current coal users, that the most likely outcome of the ban is that coal is replaced by wood 
578 biomass [26]. More strikingly, the evaluation also states that because of this replacement the 
579 ban will not likely reduce Finnish carbon dioxide emissions [26]. The statement is quite 





























































581 climate action. However, there is no reason to suspect its validity. As Sterman et al. [32] 
582 observe, while the combustion effect of wood pellets is lower than coal and the wood supply 
583 chain has higher procession emissions, “wood-fired power plants generate more CO2 per 
584 kWh than coal.”
585
586 With regard to the main goal of the transition, reducing GHG emissions in the name of 
587 climate action, the result of this path of least resistance is paradoxical. However, the 
588 increase in carbon dioxide emissions would be politically acceptable, since current GHG 
589 accounting in the EU includes wood felling in the LULUCF sector, and biofuels are deemed 
590 to be carbon-neutral [27]. Thus, even if the physical end-of-pipe emissions compared to coal 
591 burning increase, in the current regulatory framework the emissions are not penalized. This 
592 situation is, of course, not particular to Helsinki or even Finland; rather the accounting of 
593 LULUCF sector emissions, especially biomass burning, is a contentious issue worldwide 
594 [88], and researchers have warned that the new European Union renewable energy directive 
595 (RED), aimed at reaching higher renewable energy targets, could result in a situation where 
596 energy generation “consume[s] quantities of wood equal to all Europe’s wood harvests, 
597 greatly increase[s] carbon in the air for decades, and set[s] a dangerous global example.” 
598 [34].
599
600 The outcome is also closely linked to the use of the term “renewable”. As Harjanne & 
601 Korhonen [24] point out, the term “renewable” contains many ambiguities and is therefore a 
602 poor indicator for successful energy policy. In this case, energy from burning wood biomass 
603 is renewable, but not emissionless and not, without further qualifications, sustainable. Most 
604 damagingly, the concept enables bait-and switch schemes that seem to address climate 
605 change, but in reality serve other interests [24]. In the case of Helsinki DH, these interests 
606 include the economical goal of forest owners and bionenergy providers to have lucrative 





























































608 interests combined with the economic and technical path-dependency according to which “to 
609 burn something” is the most competitive available technology, are on the trajectory of locking 
610 in yet another decades long increase in carbon dioxide emissions from DH.
611
612 This potential new lock-in also introduces a new risk. It is possible that the international GHG 
613 accounting regulations and ETS are changed over time, so that the end-of-pipe emissions of 
614 wood burning have an economic effect, for instance, through inclusion in the ETS or through 
615 a price on natural carbon sinks, in which case wood biomass price is bound to increase. 
616 These worries have registered within the stakeholders, as, for instance, the chairman of the 
617 board for Helen Ltd., Osmo Soininvaara, representing the Green Party, has predicted that by 





623 The first research question was to identify the key path dependencies, constraints and 
624 legacy technological solutions in DH in Helsinki, given the goal of rapid transition. In view of 
625 the above, the path dependencies and constraints can be listed as follows:
626
627 ● The company is committed and contractually bound (economic constraint)
628 ● to reliable service (socio-economic path-dependence) 
629 ● during peak load periods (material constraint). 
630 ● This together with the high-temperature nature (material path-dependence) of the 
631 network means that no non-burning technology currently exists to replace coal.
632 ● In current GHG accounting frameworks, emissions from wood burning are calculated 





























































634 emission accounting perspective, the move from coal to wood is possible.
635 ● In addition, the bioeconomy framework of the current government supports wood 
636 biomass by subsidies and taxation (political constraint) and
637 ● coal use in energy generation is banned by 2029 (political constraint).
638
639 The second research question concerned the role of these path-dependencies in 
640 complicating the transition towards carbon-free energy. Due to the material path-
641 dependency, government supported market environment and regulatory framework, the 
642 trajectory for DH in Helsinki produces a green paradox if coal is replaced by wood biomass: 
643 even if all stakeholders are committed to reducing GHG emissions and act on their 
644 commitment, physical emissions may grow. Moreover, this green paradox may be enforced 
645 by a future lock-in. For the utility company and its owner, investments into heat producing 
646 units are long-term affairs, with pay-back times extending well over a decade. Thus 
647 investing, for instance, in wood biomass burning base load units means, other things being 
648 equal, that biomass will be burned for decades, so that the increase in carbon dioxide 
649 emissions is perpetuated. 
650
651 This is the crux of the path-dependent nature of the green paradox at hand. The need (and, 
652 from the company’s contractual and commercial perspectives, responsibility) to do long-term 
653 investments in industrial-scale infrastructure locks in future emissions for decades. If the 
654 decision happens at a moment when coal emissions are penalized but biomass emissions 
655 are not, the result may be an increase in emissions even though the explicitly expressed 
656 reason for infrastructure overhaul is to decrease emissions. 
657
658 The third research question was the policy implications to be drawn form the case. As noted 





























































660 emissions are included in the accounting of the LULUCF sector when the timber is felled (not 
661 when it is burned). Clearly, a more uniform accounting would level the field. For instance, a 
662 regime where carbon dioxide emissions would have a price, regardless of the fuel burned, 
663 and coal sinks would be compensated, would create a uniform price mechanism, where coal 
664 and wood biomass would compete on an equal footing with regard to their contribution to 
665 actual atmospheric carbon dioxide emissions. These policy issues are, for the most part, 
666 outside the purview of local and national legislation, so any initiative for change most likely 
667 needs to happen through attention to the more general level danger that the inconsistent 
668 accounting and directives pose, as pointed out in [34]. 
669
670 Likewise, as argued in [24], the notion of “renewable energy” functions as a term that 
671 somewhat obscures the fact that wood biomass is not a carbon free fuel. A more nuanced 
672 research and public discourse is needed, such that combustible and non-combustible forms 
673 of energy generation, and carbon-intensive, low-carbon and carbon-free energy systems can 
674 be distinguished and discussed in policy settings unambiguously. Our case study 
675 corroborates the hypothesis in [24] that the ambiguity of the term “renewable”, as it appears 
676 both on the national and EU level discussions, contributes to the potential green paradox.
677
678 The DH network itself, with the power plants, pipe networks and consumer equipment, is a 
679 massive and expensive piece of infrastructure, where major changes are expensive and 
680 slow. If, indeed, it is the case, first, that currently no non-burning technology exists for 
681 provisioning for the peak loads, and, second, that transition to a wood biomass base load 
682 means a commitment to decades of increased carbon dioxide emissions, then it would make 
683 sense to reconsider the social and economic constraints that are behind the need for the 
684 peak load. For instance, the need for the peak load could be alleviated by reformulating the 
685 contracts between the company and its clients so that the company could provide a lower 





























































687 the comfort level provided by the service would not be totally welcome by the customers. 
688 This brings up the cultural aspect of energy transitions [90] and underlines that a more 
689 realistic and detailed understanding of the material path-dependencies and constraints of the 
690 legacy infrastructure might help to further the needed steps of transition in terms of social 
691 acceptability.
692
693 The last point also touches on the role of the city. The city obligates the company, Helen 
694 Ltd., to competitive market performance. At the same time, it has set itself the goal of being 
695 carbon neutral by 2035. These goals are, to some extent, at cross purposes, in so far as no 
696 non-burning technology exists for provisioning for current DH needs at competitive prices. 
697 Thus a more realistic and detailed knowledge of the existing DH infrastructure and its 
698 constraints would help the city place more realistic demands on the company and itself. If it 
699 prioritizes the goal of being carbon free, as it given the current knowledge on climate change 
700 and its effects should, it should relax the economic constraints on the company so that it has 
701 more leeway in terms of investment and operational costs. If more costly technologies were 





707 In so far as there are other DH systems with similar path-dependencies and constraints, the 
708 lessons from the case study may apply. This is most likely the case in (Northern) European 
709 countries that share the relevant EU regulations and goals, including the ETS system and 
710 the RED directive, as well as climatic conditions. This gives grounds to generate a 
711 hypothesis on the basis of the case study: in Northern European DH systems that transition 
712 away from fossil fuels, especially coal, the path of least resistance points towards burning 





























































714 burning alternative implies larger systemic changes (for instance, re-dimensioning of 
715 network, reformulating contractual obligations, changing customer expectations, etc.) that 
716 are likely to be also more costly.
717
718 However, the lessons from the case study are obviously limited by particular constraints in 
719 the DH system in Helsinki. First is the bioeconomy framework strongly pushed by the 
720 government of PM Sipilä. The bioeconomy framework has helped create a situation 
721 favorable to transition to wood biomass, through both direct economic subsidies for wood 
722 energy and through encouraging public perception of the benefits of wood biomass use. 
723 Here the ambiguity of the term “renewable” has been consequential, not the least by uniting 
724 the goals of forest owners and the analyzed NGOs in supporting banning coal, with the 
725 expected replacement of coal by wood biomass. 
726
727 As noted above, the bioeconomy framework has been questioned and criticized by 
728 researchers and politicians. It is possible that a future national government may formulate a 
729 different strategy, especially if it prioritizes rapid transition, and wood biomass may lose 
730 some of its advantage. However, given the weight of the forest sector in Finnish economy, it 
731 is unlikely that any national government would set climate or sustainability criteria for wood 
732 energy that would be more ambitious than those on the EU level. Consequently, a definitive 
733 dismantling of the potential for green paradox in cases like Helsinki DH would most likely 
734 demand a change in how GHG emissions from wood burning are included in emission 
735 accounting and target setting on the EU and/or global level.
736
737 Second, the city as the sole owner of the utility company has created goals that are at cross-
738 purposes: to generate revenue and to transition to carbon neutrality. The city could prioritize 
739 carbon neutrality and relax the demand for revenue. Due to the loss of revenue, this would 





























































741 not be available in other cases.
742
743 Third, the DH network in Helsinki is exceptionally reliable and prepared for undiminished 
744 service also during prolonged cold spells. If a DH provider and its customers would be willing 
745 to use less heat during cold spells, the peak load demanded from the system would be 
746 lower, and consequently provisioning with non-burning alternatives would be easier. 
747
748 Due to the use of participant observation as a method, some of the results are tied to 
749 particular events happening within a given time frame. For instance, the views of the 
750 stakeholders, the utility company, politicians and NGOs, are likely to evolve in time, so that a 
751 return back to the views present at the time of observation is not possible. Thus the 
752 independent verifiability of these observations is necessarily limited. However, the limitation 
753 seems acceptable, especially given the fact that the answers to the three research questions 
754 rely mostly on publicly available records. The data from participant observation has helped in 
755 confirming that the facts presented in the publicly available materials are, indeed, facts on 
756 which the stakeholders rely in their views and actions, and in focusing on crucial facts that 
757 underlie the positions of the stakeholders. 
758
759 For instance, the importance of reliability of service and contractual obligations is mentioned 
760 in the materials published by Helen Ltd., but observing the argumentation by current and 
761 previous representatives of Helen Ltd. helped drive home the centrality of these constraints 
762 in the reasoning done in the company. Likewise, discussions with local politicians and 
763 representatives of NGOs focused attention to the factors enabling the potential green 
764 paradox: in their perspective the potential is an unfortunate side effect of, on one hand, 

































































770 The DH system in Helsinki has evolved on the basis of cogeneration of heat and electricity 
771 from coal burning. The company operating the system is contractually obligated to a given 
772 peak load, even during prolonged periods of cold weather, and its customers are 
773 accustomed to reliable service. In addition, the owner of the company, the city of Helsinki, 
774 expects the company both to be commercially viable in terms of returning a profit to the 
775 owner and to provision DH in a carbon neutral manner in line with the goals set by the city 
776 and the wider metropolitan area. This, together with a new national legislation banning the 
777 burning of coal for energy generation by 2029 means that, at the moment, the most 
778 economic and technically reliable option for the company is to start burning wood biomass.
779
780 The outcome is unfortunate, as research has shown that GHG emissions from burning wood 
781 are higher than from burning coal, at least for a period of several decades, before the 
782 “carbon debt” from loggings may be repaid by regenerated woodland. However, this fact, 
783 even if observed, is not seen as reason not to use wood biomass by the company, as 
784 burning wood biomass is excluded from the EU emission trading system and thus does not, 
785 unlike coal, appear in the emission accounting of the company or the city.  
786
787 In sum, it seems that as hypothesized in the literature, green paradoxes, in the sense of 
788 unintended negative consequences of climate policies, are indeed possible, as evidenced by 
789 the situation created in Helsinki DH, where regulation aimed at diminishing GHG emissions 
790 together with the economic-technological path dependencies of the DH system drive a 
791 transition from coal to wood biomass, with the possible effect of increasing atmospheric 
792 GHG emissions.
793





























































795 accounting, for instance on the EU level, that would better unify the accounting of the 
796 LULUCF sector (loss of sinks via logging, existing sinks in forests) and the ETS sector.
797 Also, a different ownership policy by the city could provide more economical leeway for the 
798 company, so that a more intensive and costly transition would become an option. Third, the 
799 task of transition could be made easier if the customers adjusted their levels of expectations 
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